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forming that Council at large in different committees. Of late its
Judicial Committee hears and determines causes of the greatest importance, and criminal as well as civil causes; and though the
judgment is given by the sovereign, yet, in all cases, it is given in
conformity to the committee's recommendation. In 1832-38, great
changes were introduced when the Court of Delegates and Commission of Review were abolished, and the hearing of causes was ccnfined to certain members of the Privy Council. But no objections
wern made to these important measures on the ground of their
touching the prerogative. Nor could any the least objection be
urged to the improvement we have been suggesting, upon the
mode and manner of exercising the power to remit or commute
sentences.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, April Term, 1857.
3AZIN VS. THE LIVERPOOL AND PHILADELPHIA STEAMSHIP CO.'
1. Whcre A makes a contract in the form of a bill of lading, in which B, the shipowner, undertakes to send forward A's goods by a particular ship at a particular
time, the shipper is entitled to have the very contract made fulfilled, and if 3, the
ship-owner substitutes another ship instead of the one stipulated for, he has
substituted different risks, and will be held as an insurer against all losS from
wbatsoever cause.
2. The rule by which damages are to be assessed against a carrier, where the shipper*s goods are lost through his ignorance or want of care and skill, is their net
value at the port of deiivery. 'The carrier is not liable for any speculation or
pel-ible profits, which the owner might have anticilatedilin his peouliar business.

This was an appeal from a decree in the admiralty, in which a
party claimed compensation rrom ship-owners for his goods lost at
sea, i ltile on .;Ii^r vessel. The case was thus :
B3azin, the hLllant, was a retailer of French perfumery, in PlijlaI From the 'MS. oi 3d Wallace, Jr.
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delphia. Being in Paris in 1854, he purchased a large stock of
goods for his business in America, which were shipped from Havre
to Philadelphia. The respondents were the owners of a line of
several steamships sailing between the ports of Liverpool and Philadelphia. For greater regularity and convenience of passengers and
traders, the vessels sailed at regular intervals, from these ports;
-certain vessels being usually named for certain days, when it was
conveni6nt so to do; but there not having been, apparently, any
contract with the public that special vessels should sail on special
days. The Steamship Company had their agents stationed at
.Havre, authorized to receive goods meant to be sent from France to
the United States, and to issue bills of lading. On the 28th of
August, 1854, their agent at Havre gave the libellant a bill of lading,
containing the following clause, viz: "RBeceived in and upon the
steamship called the Shamrock, whereof is master for the present
voyage, Little, or whoever else may go as master in the said ship,
and now lying in the port of Havre, and bound for Liverpool, eighteen cases of merchandise; the said goods to be transhipped at
Liverpool on board the Liverpool and Philadelphia steamship City
of l1lanchester,or other steamship appointed to sail for Philadelphia,
on Wednesday, the 6th day of September, and failing shipment by
her, then by the first steamship sailing after that date, for Philadelphia; and are to be delivered in like good order and condition, at
the aforesaid port of Philadelphia." The bill of lading was quite
formal in several other specifications, as to the mode of landing the
goods, &c., and contained exceptions against loss by "the act of
God, the Queen's enemies, Pirates, restraints of Princes and Rulers,
fire at sea or on shore, accidents from machinery, boilers,. steam, or
any other accidents of the seas, rivers and steam navigation, of
whatever nture or kind soever."
The respondents also owned, as one. of their line, another steamship, called The City of Philadelphia,which was .appointed to sail
-on the 80th of August, 1854, for the port of Philadelphia. The
libellant's eighteen cases by the Shamrock, from Havre, arrived at
Liverpool in time to put them on board of The City of Philadelphia,
and they were so dispatched a week before the time that was pro-
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vided for in the bill of lading, on a different vessel. The respondents
accordingly shipped sixteen of them by her; the other two were
afterwards shipped by The City of Xllanchester, on the 6th of September, 1854. The City of Philadelphia sailed on her first voyage,
bound to Philadelphia, on the 80th of August, 1854. On the 6th
of September, 1854, while on her voyage, she struck the point of
Cape Race, and was wrecked. Two of the cases were entirely lost,
and others much damaged; while the two cases not put on board
the Philadelphia, arrived in The City of Manchester in due season,
and in order.
The evidence as to the sea-worthiness of the ship, and as to the
cause of the disaster, was that of the captain, and as follows: "She
was a new ship. I saw her in course of construction. She was
built of iron, of the very best description; the character of the
workmen stood very high on the Clyde; the naval constructors and
workmen were of high character. She was in every respect a seaworthy vessel, at the time she started on her voyage. No expense
was spared in fitting her up properly. She was well rigged and
well manned; she continued sea-worthy. She struck the point of
Cape Race-up to that time she continued perfectly sea-worthy.
If she had not struck, at the average rate of our passage, we would
have been in Philadelphia in five days more. The steamer was
wrecked. We backed off the point of Cape Race, and run her on
shore to save the lives of the passengers, and to keep her from sinking. There was no tempest; she struck in a dense fog-and the
sinking of the vessel, and the damage done, resulted from her striking
the cape."
No other account was given of the cause of the loss; and it was
supposed that the iron vessel had caused the needle to deflect. The
vessel was between thirty and forty miles out of her proper course
when she struck.
There was no proof, except as it was given by the bill of lading,
that Bazin knew anything about the respective vessels, or that he
had preferred one vessel rather than another. His libel, however,
alleged that "some time previous to the day of shipment, he had by
letter direct d his agent in France to send his goods by The City
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of Manchester, to. sail from the port of Liverpool on the 6t4 day of
September, .18541 knowing 'Aer to be a safe "andreliable ,tedmslip,
and under skiliful management; and that when in France, he had
personally given the same orders, and made all his arrangements
accordingly." The answer of the Steamship Company, stated that
"the substantial and exclusive object of the contract, as understood
between the parties, and as appears upon the face of the bill of
lading, and as understood by the usages of trade, was. to transport
the eighteen cases of merchandise named therein, to Philadelphia,
in the United States, in the shortest time, and in the earliest steamer,
after the merchandise arrived from Havre." "The particular steamship," they answered, "which was to sail on the 6th of September,
being named in the said bill of lading, was so named, inasmuch as
the parties to the contract had reason to believe,, from the usual
facts which were incident to forwarding goods from Havre to Liverpool, that thefirst steamer to sail after the arrival of the merchandise would be The City of Manchester." They alleged, "that had
The City of-Manchester, which was advertised to sail on the 6th of
September, been for any cause unable to proceed upon her voyage,
they would, either by some other vessel to sail on that day, or by
the first vessel sailing after that day, have shipped the said cases
direct to Philadelphia. But that the cases arriving from H'vre in
time for shipment by The City of Philadelphia, which sailed on the
30th of August,-the respondents, in the diligent and faithful discharge of duty, desiring that the libellant should receive his goods
in the shortest possible time, and in compliance with the customary
mode of the particular business of the respondents, and settled usage
of trade in this respect, shipped sixteen of said cases, safely and in
good order, upon The City of Philadelphia, rather than permit the
same to lose an entire week by remaining on deposit in Liverpool,
for the sailing of the vessel appointed for the 6th of September.
A witness was examined by the respondents, in order to confirm
this view, and to show a custom varying the obligation to comply
with the terms of the bill of lading, and to show, that in forwarding
the goods more expeditiously than they would have done by complying with those terms, they had acted in a usual and legal way, and
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one always desired by shippers. His testimony was thus: "According to the best of my knowledge and belief, there does exist at
Liverpool, a gereralusage, custom and practice,amongst forwarding
companies, as respects the time, order and manner of the shipment
of goods senL to them, to be carried to the United States of America.
Such general usage, custom and practice is, that the goods so sent
for shipment should be shipped to their place of destination with
all dispatch, and, if possible, by the fit st vessel of the company
then next sailing, in order to get the goods intc the foreign market
with every expedition, for the benefit and advantage of the shippers
or consignees; I believe the British and North American Royal
Mail Steam Packet Company, commonly called the Cunard Company, recognize and adopt this custom and usage, and I am not
aware of there being any other British steam shipping Company,
having steamers for business purposes, between Liverpool and the
United States of America. I am not aware of any other general
rule, order, practice, usage or custom, other than what I have deposed
to, which has existed ever since I have been in the employment of
the Company, about three years; it is not a secret practice, usage
or custom, but, so far as I know, it is generally known to the shippers by the said Steamship Company's vessels. I first became
aware of the fact that such custom existed at the time when I took
charge of that department in the office of the Company, which
enabled me to have a knowledge of such custom by my intercourse
with parties conducting business. I cannot state when this custom
first arose, although I believe it has been of long standing, nor can
I state, except as I have already done, amongst whom it prevails,
nor whether it is subject to any, or what exceptions.' I believe, and
I have no doubt it is the fact, that shippers do frequently designate
particular ships or vessels to carry their goods, but I say that I do
not know, and I do not believe, that there is amongst shippers a
preference sometimes for particular Ships of the same line, or the
masters commanding the same, and I have not known instances in
which shippers have delayed sending goods by a particular ship
when there was full opportunity to do so, in order that they might
go oI be shipped by some other vessel sailing at a subsequent time,
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which they, for any reasons, preferred, except in such instances
where several ships belonging to different parties are destined for
the same port, to sail about the same time, and in those instances,
I believe, a preference is given to a ship of the first class, in preference to a ship of a minor class, although the ship of the first
class should be advertised to sail some days after the ship of the
minor class; but in the case of this Company, all their vessels are
of the first class, and are all commanded by masters of reputed
skill and experience, and no preference is made by shippers as to
'whether their goods are to be shipped by the one vessel or by the
other, and in all instances, as far as I know and believe, the shippers expect and rely upon their goods being shipped by the first
vessel, regardless of her name or of the name of her master."
Upon this case, the District Court decreed pro forma, in favor
of the libellant, Bazin, for the original cost of the goods, adding
expenses and cost of transportation, -with seventy-five per cent.,
that being proved to be a fair sum or rate for "anticipated business
profits."
Mr. Webster and Xr. EI. H. Phillips for the libellant, now made
the following points:
1. That the bill of lading formed an absolute contract to ship
libellant's goods by The City of Manchester, sailing on the 6th of
September, 1854; and that any shipment of them by the respondents
prior to that time, 'was at their own risk, and in violation of the
contract.
-2. That no usage prevailing at Liverpool could vary an express
contract, more especially one made at Havre, -where no knowledge
of such usage was shown to exist.
8. That assuming that the respondents had the right to ship by
The City of Philadelphia, they were nevertheless liable, since they
had failed to show that she was lost through any of the perils
excepted in the bill of lading.
4. That the ineasure of* the libellant's damages was the market
value of goods here, at the time they should have been delivered,
in estimating which there was to be added to the original cost, not
only duties and charges, but an allowance for the advance in value
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-which they acquired in the market, the moment they were in condition to be sold, whether called profits, or by any other name.
On the part of the respondents, .r. J. X,1..usA contended as
follows :
1. That the receipt for the goods given in Havre, was not a
maritime contract, but only an engagement preliminary to a maritime contract, and therefore not within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the District Court.
2. That the respondents were not bound to detain the goods in
Liverpool to await the sailing of the Manchester, but under the law,
as -well as from usage, iz was their right as well as duty, to send
them forward by The City of Philadelphia.
3. That anticipated profits could not be recovered, but only
market value, or the amount it would take to replace the goods.
The opinion of the court -was delivered by
GRIER, J.-The objection that the contract is not a maritime
contract, cannot be supported. The case presents a bill of lading
by which defendants bind themselves to carry goods received at
Havre, and deliver them in Philadelphia. It is a contract for a
maritime service, and it would be difficult to say -what is a maritime
contract if it be not one. If it had been merely an agreement by
respondents -with libellant, that if he would send goods by theirline, they would receive and forward them for a certain considera-.
tion, and the breach of the agreement was in refusing to receive or"
transport the libellant's goods at all, or for the consideration stipu-.
lated, then this first objection of the respondents would apply. But
when the respondents have received the goods on board their vessel,.
and given a bill of lading to transport them abross the ocean, it can.
hardly be called a preliminary agreement to a maritime contract,.
and not the contract itself.
The case then presents these two questions on the merits,
1st. Are respondents liable?
2d. If so, what is the rule of damagesi and how is their amountto be ascertained?
The reason given by the answer why The City 'of- Manchester30
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was named in the contract, may possibly have been the true one, or
that assigned by the libel, to wit: that the libellant "directed his
agent in France to send his goods by The City of Manchester,"
which was advertised to sail on the 6th of September, because he
knew her to be a safe and reliable vessel, and under skillful management. But we need not search for any reason, " Stet pro ratione voluntas." The libellant may, in fact, have had no better
reason than that he believed The City of Manchester to be a lucky
vessel, or he may very justly have preferred a tried boat and crew
to a new iron steamer, whose officer or whose compass had not been
tested by a trip across the ocean. Reason or no reason, he had a
right to have his contract fulfilled according to-its stipulations, and
the result has shown that if such had been the case, his goods would
have arrived safely. If the goods had been sent by the Manchester, the risks excepted in the bill of lading would have been borne
by. the libellant. For them he was his own insurer, and the carrier of those not excepted. If the carrier changes the vessel and
the time of dispatching the goods, he has substituted different risks
from those stipulated by the parties, and should be held as insurer
against all loss, from whatsoever cause. The loss to libellant is a
result of defendant's breach of contract. But, assuming that the
libellant had no good reason for desiring his goods to be sent by a
particular vessel, and that the insertion of the name of the Manchester was merely pro forma, to fill up the usual blanks in a printed
bill of lading, is there any evidence whatever that the goods were
not injured in consequence of any accident excepted in the bill of
lading ?
The respondents aver that the ship was seaworthy in every way;
the libellant denies the fact in his replication. The testimony of
the captain shows his steamboat to have been new, made of iron,
tight and staunch, well rigged and manned. The only account
given of the loss of the vessel, was as follows: "She struck the
point of Cape Race; up to that time she continued perfectly seaworthy. If she had not struck, at the average of our rate we
should have been in Philadelphia in- five days. The steamer was
wrecked. We backed off the point of Cape Race and run her on
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shore to save the lives of the passengers, and to keep her from
sinking. There was no tempest. She struck in a dense fog ; the
sinking of the vessel and the damage done, resulted from her
striking the cape."
iere then we have no other reason given by the captain, nor any
testimony whatever, as to how or why this great mistake of running
against a cape occurred. The answer and the witness both seem to
assume that running against a cape or a continent is one of the
usual accidents and unavoidable dangers of the sea. That cannot
be termed an "accident of the sea" within the exceptions of the
bill of lading, which proper foresight and skill in the commanding
officer might have avoided. If the compass on the new iron vessel
was not sufficiently protected to traverse correctly, the vessel was
as little seaworthy as if she had no compass-and this should have
been carefully ascertained before she started on her voyage. If
there was no fault in the compass, then it is very evident that the
officer who is .thirty or forty miles wrong in his calculation, and
driving through a thick fog with a full head of steam, and first discovers his true position by running on an island, a cape, or a continent, has neither the skill nor the prudence to be entrusted with
such a command-and for Want of such an officer the vessel is not
seaworthy.
The loss of the goods committed to a carrier and in possession of
his servants, puts the burden of proof on him, to show how it took
place, and that it was not by their fault, but in consequence of
some of the unavoidable accidents excepted in the bill of lading.
The respondents have not alleged or proved any one fact tending
to relieve them from responsibility. That a steamboat has been
either ignorantly, carelessly or Tecklessly dashed against a cape in
a thick fog, cannot be received as a plea to discharge the carrier.
Yet for any thing that appears-such is the case before us. If there
were Any circumstances tending to lead to a contrary conclusion,
they are not in evidence in the case.
II. The rule of damages in these cases is, thaV'the carrier shall
pay for goods not delivered their net value at the port of delivery.
He is not liable for any speculation or possible profits which the
I
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owner might have anticipated in his peculiar business. Thus, suppose the carrier liable for non-delivery of a hundred barrels of flour
at Philadelphia on a given day, and on that day. flour is worth five
dollars.a barrel, the amount of the owner's damage is clearly just
$500, because he could have bought a hundred barrels of flour and
supplied his loss for $500. The owner cannot be allowed to show
that he was a baker, and could in a few weeks have cleared ten dollars a barrel by manufacturing his. flour into bread. The sum of
money which represented the net value of the lost articles, with

intbrest till paid, is all that can be recovered from the carrier when
goods have been lost in the course of transportation. And as the.
owner would have paid freight as a deduction from the net value of
his flour, so when the carrier pays its value, he will be entitled to
have his freight deducted, if it has not been paid.
Ia all cases when the article to be delivered has a definite market
*alue, the application of the rule is without any difficulty.
The libellant keeps a variety store in Philadelphia. The eighteen
cases contained a selection of ten thousand articles of perfumery,
&c., &c., to be found .only in such shops. They are retailed generally at one hundrea per cent. profit on the .original cost in Paris.
But few, if any, of these numerous trifles, have any known wholesale or market value in Philadelphia, nor could libellant have supplied himself with the lost goods most probably in the Philadelphia
market at any reasonable price. How, then, are we to arrive at
a rule of damages to ascertain the amount of loss to libellant for
the, non-delivery of his articles? Certainly not as contended by
his counsel, by taking the original cost, adding . expenses and
charges of transportation, seventy-five per cent. "for los8 of anticipated profit."

If these articles, like most other goods and wares, bad a known
value in market here, for which they could be purchased, the original
cost and charges of transportation would have nothing to do with the
calculation. But as such isnot the case in the present instance, we
must inquire what was the original cost and what the charges of
transportation, &c., in order to arrive at their value here; or more
properly, what would it cost to get other goods of precisely the
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same value in place of those lost. Now, we may assume (as nothing
is pretended to the contrary) that a bill for the very same sort of
articles which Mr. Bazin has purchased could be filled in Paris -for
the same sum of money. In less than sixty days, every article not
delivered here by the carrier, could be put in Mr. Bazin's shop, for
the same price which he has paid for them. But he will have lost
only the interest of his money for sixty days longer. How much
profit he might have made by retailing them, or what the amount
of "anticipated business profits," being matters not capable of
certain ascertainment, cannot make a part of the consideration.
Legal interest is all that the law knows as the damage for detention
of money. As the goods lost, therefore, have no market value
here, and could not be purchased in our market, their value must
be ascertained by adding costs and charges, and sixty days' interest
on this sum. From this amount deduct freight, which is unpaid,
and add interest on the balance till judgment.
If counsel can agree upon the amount of damages calculated on
these principles, the decree will be entered for such amount; if not,
the case will be referred to a master to report.

it the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
PAGE VS. DENNISON.

1. The mother of a child born in wedlock, but begotten before, is not a competent
witness, to prove that the child was not begotten by the man who became her
husband before its birth, in the absence of evidence of non-access.
2 Where no evidence of non-access at the time of conception was given, the declarations and acts of the husband and wife at the birth of the child, and subse-

quently, were inadmissible to prove it illegitimate.
Per Lowan:, J.,dissenting1. In an inheritance cas6, where the claimant was begotten before and born after
marriage, the mother is a competent witness to prove that her deceased husband,
whose estate is the subject of the claim, was not the father of the claimant.
2. Where a child was

egOtten before and born after marriage, and at the time of

its birth, both the mother and her husband denied that it was his child, and it
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was, within a few days, sent away from his house and reared by its maternal
grandfather, and never admitted into the family of the husband, nor reputed as
his child; this is evidence, in an inheritance case, that the child isillegitimate.
3. Presumption on the subject of legitimacy, examined historically and on principle.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette county.

Par-

tition.
The case was tried before GILMO tE, P. J. The facts, so far as
they are essential to an understanding of the points involved, are
sufficiently stated in the opinion. The case was argued by
_aine, for plaintiff in error, and
J. If. Ewing, for the defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
K-ox, J.-Mary Dennison was born three months after the
marriage of her mother with Samuel Page. Her right to any part
of his real estate, was denied upon the allegation that he was not
her father. To determine the question of her legitimacy an issue
was certified by the Orphans' Court of Fayette County, to the Court
of Common Pleas.
Upon the trial, the defendants offered to prove by -Mrs. Mary
Page, the mother of Mrs. Dennison, that Samuel Page was not her
father; that she was begotten before the witness was married to
Samuel Page, and that he did not beget her. The refusal of the
Court of Common Pleas to receive Mrs. Page's testimony, forms the
first assignment of error.
Where a child is begotten and born whilst its mother is a m.arried
woman, its legi1timacy is presumed, until the contrary is clearly
made to appear. This presumption can be removed by showing
that the husband had no sexual intercourse with his wife at any time
when it was possible for the child to have been begotten. Does the
ante-nuptial conception weaken the presumption of legitimacy
arising from the post-nuptial birth ? It is well settled by authority
that it does not. A child born in wedlock, though born within a
month or a day after marriage, is legitimate by presumption of law.
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Co. Litt. 244 a. And where a child is born during wedlock, of which
the mother was visibly pregnant, at the marriage, it is presumed
juris et dejure that it was the offspring of the husband. In Bex
vs. Luff, 8 East, 193, Lord Ellenborough said, that "with respect
to the case where the parents have married so recently before the
birth of the child that it could not have been begotten in wedlock,
it stands upon its own peculiar ground. The marriage of the parties
is the criterion adopted by the law in cases of ante nuptial generation. for ascertaining the actual parentage of the child. For this
purpose it will not examine when the gestation began, looking only
to the recognition of iG by the husband in the subsequent act of
marriage." And in the same case, Le Blanc, J. said, "Our attention has been called to cases where a child born within a short time
after the marriage of the parents, is by the rule of law considered
legitimate. That is a rule of law not to be broken in upbn, except
as in other cases by proof of natural imbecility &c.
In Stigall vs. Stigall, 2 Brockenbrough, 256, the marriage preceded
the birth about six months, and there was no reason to suppose it a
premature birth, yet the case was treated by 0. J. Marshall precisely as though the child was begotten in wedlock, making the
question of legitimacy depend upon the access of the husband. In
Bowles vs. Bingham, 2 Munford, 442, the marriage took place in
January, and the birth in the succeeding April. The opinion of
the court, delivered by Judge Roan, is to be found in 3 Munford,
599, and it clearly establishes the doctrine that the presumption of
legitimacy is the same where the child is born in wedlock whether
begotten before or after. So in the State vs. Wilson, 10 Iredell,
131. And in the State vs. Herman, 18 Iredell, 502, the same rule
is asserted and followed.
In the last mentioned case, where the child was born five months
and two days after the marriage, Chief Justice Ruffin, in delivering
the opinion of the court, said: "There seenis to be no difference
in point of law between a case where the conception was prior or
posterior to thei marriage, provided the birth be after wedlock, for
that makes the legitimacy."
It follows from the authorities above quoted, that the legitimacy
I
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of a child born in wedlock, though begotten before the marriage, is
founded upon the supposition that it was begotten by the man who
so*sequently became its mother's husband, and that this presumption can only be rebutted by clearly proving that no sexual intercourse occurred between the two at any time when the child could
4*ve been begotten. Whether it was begotten in or out of wedlock,
Where the marriage precedes the birth, the presumption of paternity
is the same, and the like evidence is required to bastardize the issue.
That evidence is proof of non-access. Where the husband, or he
who subsequently becomes such, has access to the mother of the
child, the presumption that he is its father is conclusive. By the
term access, used in this sense, we understand actual sexual intercourse; and this is presumed in the one case from the existence of
the marital relation, and in the other from the subsequent mkrriage.
Where marriage follows pregnancy and precedes birth, he who
marries the pregnant woman is presumed to be the fath6r of the
after-born child. Upon this presumption rests the doctrine of the
common law, that legitimacy follows birth in wedlock.
The question before the jury was, whether or not Samuel Page
was the father of Mrs. Dennison? That he was her father, his
marriage with her mother before her birth clearly establishes in the
absence of proof of non-access. The proffered testimonyin substance
-though not in form-was to prove non-access.
That the mother was incompetent to prove this, is perfectly well
settled by abundant and uniform authority. Non-access cannot be
proved by either the husband or the wife, whether the action be
civil or criminal, or whether the proceeding is one of settlement or
bastardy, or to recover property claimed as heir at law.
I will mention some of the numerous cases where the question has
been decided.
In Rex vs. Rook, Wilson, 840, which was a bastardy case, it was
held that the wife could not be a witness to prove non-access.
The same point had been previously decided in Rex vs. -Inhabitants
of Reading, Cases Temp. Hardwicke, 82. Rex vs. Luffe, 8 East,
193, was also a bastardy case, and there Lord Ellenborough said
that the rule which forbade the wife to prove non-access, "was
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founded upon a principle of public policy, which prohibits the wife
from being examined against her husband, in any matter affecting
his interest or character." In Goodrightt vs. Moss, 2 Cowp. 5NQ
where the question of legitimacy arose in an action of ejectment,
Lord 'Mansfield said, "cas to the time of the birth, the father and
mother are the most proper witnesses to prove it. But it is a rle
founded in decency, morality and policy, that they shall not be
permitted to say after marriage that they have had no connection,
and therefore that the offspring is spurious."
In ( ope vs. Cope, 1 Moody and Robinson, 269,which was an
issue out of Chancery, t(, try the legitimacy of Willis Cope, Justice
Alderson said, "the wife is not allowed to prove the illegitimacy
of the child, as by showing non-access." In the King vs. Tie Inhtabitants of lfea, 11 East, 131, a settlement case, an attempt was
made to prove by the mother, the non-access of the husband, on the
ground that the husband was dead at the time of the tiial, but
Lord Ellenborougb, with the concurence of the other judges, decided that the evidence of the wife ought not to be received to
prove non-access, whether the husband was living or dead when the
evidence was offered.
In the cases already referred to in 10 arid 18 Iredell, the evidence of the mother to prove non-access was held to be incompetent, and these were both cases where pregnancy preceded marriage.
The same rule is laid down by the elementary writers on evidence,
Starkie, Phillips, Greenleaf and others, and to the same effect is
our own case of the Commonwealth vs. Shepherd, in 6 Binney, 283.
It is true that the same reasons are not always given for the rule. In
some of the cases it is said to be founded upon the question of
interest, and in others upon a question of policy, but whatever may
be the reason for the rule, whether good, bad or indifferent, the
rule itself is an inflexible one, and in no event can the wife be permitted to prove non-access of the husband. There was no error
therefore, committed, in rejecting the evidence of Mrs. Mary Page.
But the defendant further offered to prove that Samuel Page said
at the time of the birth of Mary Dennison, that she was not his
I
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child, that he repeiited this declaration afterwards, and added that
she should never inherit any portion of his estate; that he was
found in tears on the morning of the birth; that the mother said
about the time the child was born, that it belonged to a man by the
name of Risk; that on account of the difficulty as to its legitimacy,
t6e child was taken, three days after its birth, to the house of its
mother's father, where it was reared, and that it was treated by Mr.
and Mrs. Page as illegitimate. This evidence was also rejected,
and upon its rejection, is based the remaining assignment of error.
In considering the question whether there was any error in rejecting proof of the facts above stated, it must be borne in mind
that at the time of the offer, no evidence had been given which disproved or tended to disprove sexual inteicourse between Samuel
Page and Mary the mother of Mrs. Dennison, at or about the period
of gestation, nor was it proposed to follow the offer by such evidence. The parties had lived for many years before their marriage,
within five miles of each other, but how long their acquaintance
preceded their marriage, or whether or not they, were frequently in
each other's company, was not shown upon trial. That the declarations of Mr. and Mrs. Page, at or about the time of the birth, followed as they were, by the removal of the infant to the house of its
mother's father, where it was raised as an illegitimate child, would
have strongly corroborated evidence of non-access is, to my mind,
very clear, but I am equally clear that the evidence was only
admissible as corroborative, and that it was insufficient of itself to
prove non-access.
- It cannot be denied but that the conduct of Mr. and Mrs. Page,
when the child was born, was unfavorable to its legitimacy, but the
policy of the law so strongly favors legitimacy, that it is not in the
power of either husband or wife, or both, to bastardize a child born
in wedlock.
The old rule, that the presumption of legitimacy could not be
overcome by any proof less than the absence of the husband beyond
seas, previous to and during the whole time of gestation, no longer
exists.
The inodern rule is, that where the evidence plainly shows such
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non-access,. on the part of the husband, that le could not in the
course of nature have been the father of the child, it is sufficient to
destroy its legitimacy. But nothing short of this will bastardize
one born in wedlock. Bex vs. Luffe, 8 East, 193 ; Foxcroft's
case, 1st Rolle's Ab. 859; Stigall vs. Stigall, 2 Brock, 2 56. Declarations of parents may be given in evidence to prove or disprove
marriage, where the parties have cohabited, (B. N. P. 112) or to
prove whether the child was born before or after marriage; (Goodright vs. .oss, Cowp. 591) but they are not admissible to prove
the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock. 7 Martin 558, 2 Brock.
256. So a husband's ,eclaration that a child born in wedlock is
not his, is not sufficient evidence to prove it illegitimate, notwithstanding it was born only three months after the marriage, and a
separation between the husband and wife took place by mutual
consent. Bowles vs. Bingham, 2 Munford, 442. In Morris vs.
Davis, 5 Clark and Finnelly, 163, the presumption of legitimacy
was held to be rebutted by evidence of the conduct of the husband and
wife, such as that the wife was living in adultery, that she concealed
the birth of the child from the husband, and declared to him thtat
she never had such child, that the husband disclaimed all knowledge
of the child, and acted up to his death as if no such child was in
existence; and also that the wife's paramour aided in concealing,
reared and educated it as his own, and left it all his property by
his will. Bat there was also in the case, evidence which tended
strongly to prove that the husband had no sexual intercourse with
the wife at the period of gestation; and in Rex vs. Mansfield, 1st
Queen's Bench, 449, it was held that the fact, that the wife was
living in adultery, was not sufficient to destroy the legitimacy of
a child born in wedlock, but that there must be evidence from
which a jury could find non-access. There are many other cases,
English and American, bearing upon the question here presented;
but it is unnecessary to cite them, for they are all consistent with
the points ruled in the Common Pleas; which were, 1st, That the
mother of a child born in wedlock, though begotten before, was incompetent to prove that the child was not begotten by the man who
became her husband before its birth, in the absence of evidence of
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non-access. 2d. That where no evidence of non-access at the time
of gestation was given, the declarations and acts of the husband
and wife-at the birth of the child, or subsequently, were inadmissible to prove it illegitimate.
The following dissenting opinion was delivered by
LowliE, J.-We have only one rule of positive law applicable
to this case, and that is, that lawful children shall be heirs of their
parents. In case of dispute, it is the duty of the courts to investigite and decide who are the lawful children; and this is our present
question. The law gives us no positive rules for deciding it, and
therefore it is our duty to look to reason and experience for direction, and to receive in evidence all such facts as naturally tend to
cast light upon the subject, and to admit as witnesses, all persons
who are able to communicate such facts, unless experience excludes
them as unreliable.
'But are we indeed striving to ascertain who are the real children
of Samuel Page, or only to ascertain and follow some old examples
aid maxims that would fix upon him an arbitrary and fictitious
paternity? If the former is our purpose, then we are endeavoring
to execute the law of inheritance, given to us by our superiors, the
legislative power. If the latter is our purpose, then it seems'to me
that we are endeavoring to sustain, as positive law, the judicial
glosses upon the law of inheritance, and partially to set aside the
law which we are appointed to administer, by the false process
which we adopt of arriving at the truth.
Here it is worth while to look a little into the history of jurisprudence on this branch of human relations: for, without this, we
may fall, on one hand, into an ignorant and slavish formalism, or,
on the other, into unintelligent and reckless innovation. With it,
we may profit by the experience of predecessors, and avoid the
errors which, to them, were inevitable. Without it, we are mere
adventurers and pretended discoverers, repeating, to the injury of
others, the very errors which the experience of the past ought to
teach us to avoid. If we desire to sum up and be properly guided
by the history of this particular point in jurisprudence, we must
study to understand that history.
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. There certainly was a time in the progress of English jurisprudence, when the courts paid very little regard to the fact of paternity, and satisfied themselves with the facts of marriage and materwity in questions of heirship; and thus adopted the rule, that he
who marries a woman must father all the children afterwards born
of her. This rule has all the definiteness of positive law, and has
the merit, at least, of being easily understood and applied. And
as all positive law is received in barbarous times, according to the.
letter, and without the qualifications and distinctions of more refined
periods; so it seems very natural to find that this rule was often
applied, in ancient jurisprudence, with a strictness that is shocking
to our modern notions. It was the adoption of the maxim by
which a title to slaves and cattle is sometimes tried, partus sequitur
ventrem; and it was put into plain Saxon in John Plettesham's case,
7 H. 4. 9. b., "who bulleth my cow the calf is mine." Possibly it
was received with favor, because the ruling race found in it a mode
of ascertaining the line of succession of their tenants, and their
other rights of lordship, which was much more easily understood
than any legitimate process of arriving at the real truth. It could
hardly be expected to fit comfortably when applied to themselves,
and it is said that -parliament was, in many special instances, called
upon to correct its injustice, and did so. And perhaps its simplicity
had much to do with the answer of the barons, quod nolumus leges
Anglice mutare, when the bishops proposed to introduce the Canon
law on this subject. 20 H. 3. c. 9. Certainly the answer proves no dislike of the Roman civil law: for that was not in question, and all the
English law books written about that period, Bracton, Glanville,
and Britton Fleta, exhibit for it a special fondness.
But this rule was the result of an abandonment or very defective
performance of the judicial duty of investigation, and the substitution of an arbitrary rule, which proclaimed that there was no
sympathy between the government and its subjects. But it could
not stand, for this sympathy does exist; public justice demanded
the truth on the subject of paternity, and gradually exceptions to
this rule of evidence were allowed; first, when the husband was
incompetent, and afterwards, if he was beyond sea during all the
I
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period of his wife's gestation. This was some advance towards
allowing the truth to decide the question. But it was very limited;
'for it was of no avail if the husband was so unfortunate as to return
home even a week before the bifth. Salk. 122, 284.
And it was the very spirit of this limitation that decided the
paternity, if a man married a woman already enceinte by another,
and where a woman eloped from her husband and lived in adultery
with another man, or was married to him. Bro. Ab. Bastardy, 4,
8, 26. All these are samples of an ancient jurisprudence, that are
now everywhere called absurd. But, absurd as they are, we are in
danger of allowing their influence to be felt even in a more advanced state of society and jurisprudence, and of permitting ourselves to be guided by the opinions of judges who lived and spoke
at a time when these decisions had not ceased to influence the legal
mind; for a system generally retains the dregs of an error long
after it has been discovered and condemned. Always, where judges
have seriously undertaken to decide such cases according to the
real truth, they have broken through the rule, and have sometimes
succeeded in establishing exceptions to it, until at last it has almost
entirely faded away; and it is by this sort of continual attrition,
that nature always operates in wearing away whatever is anomalous
and obstructive of systematic harmony.
And it is worthy of notice, that these decisions never had an
absolute sway, for thtir flagrant injustice would necessarily prevent
an' entirely unbending application of them; and we find cases
wherein a wife's elopement and living in adultery-40 Ed. 3, 16;
43 Ed. 3, 19 b; 39 Ed. 3, 14; 11 Ed. 4, 174; Lib. Ass. 33, 8;
Bro. Ab. Bastardy, 21-and where the fact that the child was begotten by a stranger before marriage-18 H. 6, 31 b; 44 Ed. 3,
12 b; 45 Ed. 3, 28-were allowed their proper influence.
Let any one trace the development of jurisprudence on this subject, and he will discover that the original definition of a legitimate
child has undergone an entire change. The definition, leaving out
the case of posthumous children, was: one born in lawful wedlock.
Put this into another form, and it is plainly this: one whose mother
was, at the time of its birth, a married woman. Paternity is not
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at all regarded. But exceptions were gradually admitted, that
paid some little respect to the husband. He was not to be charged
with the child, if he was physically incompetent, or if he was beyond sea during the whole period of gestation; then if he was beyond sea at the time of conception, 8 East, 193 ; then if he was
living at such a distance from his wife as to make all intercourse
improbable; and at last, if be was living separate from her under
such circumstances of distance or alienation, as rendered intercourse improbable. At last then, the right of the husband is fully
admitted, as an element in the question of legitimacy; and the
definition of a legitimate child now stands: one whose parents were
intermarriedbefore it was born. And this change in the definition
is here and there recognized in our law books. Salk. 484; 8 East,
204, 211; Shelf. on Mar. and Div. 706-7; 2 Stephen's Com. 314.
But the old definition still stands in almost all our modern law
books, and it was followed to the letter, and-perhaps in its original
spirit, when it was decided that the husband was chargeable with
an ante-nuptial generation, whether his or not, because its mother
was his wife when it was born.
The pernicious influence of the old exploded rules is further
seen in the idea very commonly attached to the maxim: 2ater est
quem nuptie denzonstrant, which is often used as if it meant the
nuptials demonstrate the paternity; yet this is right in the face of
that other maxim: qui ex damnato coitu nasountur, inter liberos
non conputantur. Certainly it was formerly read as being equivalent to'partussequitur ventrem; but so soon as the husband's rights
began to be regarded, it began to obtain its true meaning, and in
modern days all learned men treat it as equivalent to pater a
nupvtiis prcesumitur. I say this is its true meaning, and always
was. Bracton treats it as a mere presumption, and says that it
stands until the contrary is proved. It is derived from the Roman
law, and no one will pretend that, there, it had any other meaning; and the canonists used it in the same sense. And here I
may add, that all the true and valuable principles of our old law
on this subject, were derived by our old writers from the Roman
Pandects, and all the more modern principles are there likewise.
I

PAGE vs. DENNISON.

I may add also that not one of the exploded principles of our jurisprudence ever existed in the Pandects, and I do not find that any
of them ever existed in any part of Europe where the Roman law
was adopted.
The presumptive character of the maxim, pater est, &c., is presented in the Roman law with direct bearing on this case, for there
it is held that a child, born within six months after the marriage,
pr over forty weeks after its dissolution, is presumed to be illegitimate until the contrary is proved. This is founded purely on
physiological principles or natural laws, and Hippocrates is appealed to for them. And it was on these principles that the case
of Alsop vs. Bowtrell, Cro. Jac. 541 was tried; for there the birth
was forty weeks and nine days after the husband's sudden death,
and, on the evidence of matrons and physicians, the child was declared legitimate. This is the rule also in France and Germany.
This child was begotten before and born after marriage, and we
have no other evidence of the paternity than the marriage. Is this
evidence by itself of that fact? It has been shown that the old
definition fixes the paternity by the nuptials, without regard to
truth or evidence. Then there are cases and dicta which assume
that there ought to be evidence, and which assert the principle,
that where the condition of the woman is known, it is adopted by
the act of marriage, (8 East, 208, 210, 212; 2 Brockenb. 269;
2 Munf. 442, 3 ib. 602; 13 Iredell, 502) but these are possibly
only some of the dregs of the old rule, and there are no English or
Pennsylvania cises since the abandonment of the old absurditiez,
that affirm the question. It is therefore open for discussion and
decision, on pure rational principles.
We must take the question in its simplest form: is marriage
evidence of the paternity in a case of ante-nuptial generation ? for
thus the case is presented to us. Being begotten before marriage,
certainly, until the marriage, there is no presuinption of the paternity of the yet unborn child. As a fact, the marriage does not
account for anything existing before it; but if we knew the paternity, we might account for the marriage. Out of a thousand
neighbors, the law, until the marriage, could fasten its suspicion or
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presumption upon none. It therefore presumed the innocence of
every man, and pronounced its prima facie sentence that Samuel
Page was not the father. And, as our question excludes his knowledge of the woman's condition, of course it forbids us from treating the marriage as his admission of any share in producing that
condition. If the mother had sworn the child to the true father,
and then married another man before the birth, I suppose the marriage would not have been evidence that her prior oath was per-jurious; yet if it proves one paternity and the marriage another,
there is a flat contradiction.
If, notwithstanding ah this, we still declare that the marriage
proves.the ante-nuptial paternity, we disregard the natural laws on
which presumptions are founded, and raise mere arbitrary and fictitious ones, that do not profess to declare the truth; but only to
declare that, under given circumstances, the relation of parent and
child shall be taken to exist, though all natural presumptions say
that it does not in fact exist. If this is not judicial legislation,
then I do not understand the term. If marriage fixes the paternity
of an unborn child, because the husband is presumed to admit it,
much more ought it to fix the paternity of a whole brood of bastards, already born and living with their mother at the time of their
marriage ; but nobody would venture to say this. The canon law
did not presume the paternity in such a case, though it legitimated
the children, if the paternity was admitted or proved to be in conformity with the subsequent nuptials.
The presumption of the paternity from the nuptials alone, is a
falling back upon the very prin.ciples of the old, absurd and abandoned decisions; and we might as well say that gestation might be
complete in three months or three weeks; for, when we abandon
natural presumptions and go to fictions, we are simply disregarding
truth; and then the more plainly-false they are, the less liable are
they to mislead, by being supposed to be intended for truth. Such
a fiction would have the generous merit of presuming an unnaturally prompt gestation, rather than impute incontinence to the
woman.
We add a new element to the question, when we assume that the
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husband knew the wife's condition when he married her. But a
marriage, even under such circumstances, has no direct tendency to
prove paternity. Indirectly it does tend to prove it; for marriage
with such knowledge, suggests at once to the mind, man's instinctive aversion to female infidelity, and, by the aid of this additional
element, forces him to believe, if nothing appears to the contrary,
that the marriage is an acknowledgment of paternity. But such
a conclusion is plainly one of fact and not of law, and can be drawn
only by the jury and not by the court.
As, however, these elements do not belong to our case, and we
cannot presume, from the nuptials themselves, that they accord with
the parentage, we must necessarily look for facts, arising after the
marriage, that may cast light upon the question. And certainly
we should have some natural and rational grounds of deciding it, if
we found that, after the child's birth, the husband treated it as his
own; or if we do not discover any of those facts which would ordi4arily be expected to arise on the development of a spurious progeny. Strip the cage of these, and let it appear, as it does here, that
the husband embraced the first decent opportunity of disowning the
child; that his paternity was then denied by both him and his wife;
that the child was sent away from his house, and reared, as illegitimate, by its maternal grandfather; and then we have nothing left
but the marriage, as a ground for the presumption of paternity;
and that has already been shown to be insufficient, even when there
are no facts pointing to a contrary presumption.
These conclusi6ns do not depend, for their proof, entirely upon
deductions drawn from the principles of human nature. If they
did, I would mistrust them. They have a very large experience in
their favor. In Scotland and on the continent of Europe, the
paternity of a child, begotten before marriage, is not presumed
from the nuptials alone; but from the nuptials and other circumstances preceding and following them. The Roman law presumes
bastardy, if a child be born within six months after marriage, until
the contrary is shown ; because a child of less than six months gestation is not usually born alive; and this law has undergone a
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European experience of more than a thousand years without alteration or dispute; while our old arbitrary judicial rule could never be
steadily administered, because of its disregard of justice, and has at
last been given up in all cases, if it is not still retained as the rule of
ante-nuptial generations.
I have already said, that, as a general test of paternity, it never
reigned with an unfaltering sway, and that now its arbitrary character is abandoned, and it is admitted, in the true sense of pater
est quem nuptie demonstrant, as the expression of a presumption,
deriving its measure and authority from pure principles of natural
law. An ante-nuptial case is given in the Year Book, 44 Ed. 3,
12 b., wherein evidence was admitted that another than the husband
was the father of the child, without any other ground laid for it
except that the husband was confined to his bed by sickness from
the time of his marriage until his death. Foxcroft's ca8e, as understood by Lord Ellenborough, 8 East, 200, 205, is even stronger than
this, and goes the whole length of the principles I am contending for ;
for therein a birth, twelve weeks after marriage, was condemned on
the ground that the husband was an infirm, bed-ridden man when
he was married. Lord Ellenborough's explanation of the case may
be erroneous; but still it is valuable as indicating his opinion of the
law.
But why do we presume legitimacy in any case? Mathew says
the presumption- "rests simply on the supposition of the virtuous
conduct of the mother; a branch of that equitable rule that assumes
the innocence of a party until proof be brought of actual guilt."
Pres. Evid. 22: 7 Humph. 410. If this is a correct grounding of"
the rule, then, of course, there can be no presumption of legitimacy,
arising out of marriage merely, in suth a case as this ;,for the birth
proves that the wife was not innocent. But the rule operates positively the other way, and presumes bastardy; because it presumes
the innocence of him who became the husband. '-From his lawful
act of marriage, there can be no legal presumption of any prior
unlawful act committed hy him.
The leaning in favor of innocence is carried so far as to presume-
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the death of a former husband, if be was not heard of for a year
before his wife's second marriage. 2 B. & Ald. 386: 4 Cush. 49.
And in a case of divorce a rnensa et thoro, though the parties remain
husband and wife still, being separated only "until they shall be
reconciled to each other," and intercourse is not unlawful; yet a
child begotten during the separation, is presumed a bastard, because
the husband is presumed to have obeyed the law of the separation.
Salk. 123. A fortiori then, is the presumption valid that an antenuptial conception does not proceed from the husband, because such
a presumption involves a charge of guilt. Even opportunity proved
is not a ground for such a presumption.
Let us take the old definition of a legitimate child: born in marriage, or in a competent time after; either will answer. But suppose a birth falls within both categories ; within a competent time
after the death of a former husband, and after marriage with another. Mr. Justice Bereford rescued the case from its dilemma quite
logically, by saying that the child might choose which should be its
father: and he has been quoted ever since, though no case of paternity seems to have ever been decided in that way; and Brooke
[ d
non est lex,
rejects the saying, when transmitting it to us, " quo
ut videtur."
But why was it logical? Simply because it was a legitimate issue
of false premises, or of an arbitrary rule that disregarded the truth.
The old rule admitted a portion of truth, when it admitted the competent time after the termination of the marriage, as an element in
the question of legitimacy; but it rejected the correlative portion,
when it refused to consider the competent time after the commencement of the marriage relation.
But the time being ascertained, here are two conclusive and contradictory presumptions of law, giving to the child two fathers.
Yet nature rejects this result: how shall we avoid it? By Bereford's
rule. If we will not hear the truth, we must have an arbitrary and
and complete substitute for it. We wonder that, in assigning an
umpire for this dilemma, he did not think of one who knew more
about the case. ]But Bereford's rule was too absurd, and nature

PAGE vs. DENNISON.

broke over it; and it always does in the end, break over the
strongest fortifications of error; for it always speaks the truth and
demands it.
Naturam expellas furca: tamen usque recurret,
Et mala perrumpet fatirm fastidia victrix.

Nature demands an inquiry into the very truth, in the case of too
early, as well as of posthumous births, and a decision according tonatural presumptions and probabilities. And so, in Thecar's case,
(Litt. R. 177; Co. Litt. 123 b. note,) it was after a trial by jury on
the facts that the child was declared Thecar's son ; the first and not
the second husband's.
But this claimant never was acknowledged nor reputed to be the
daughter of Samuel Page: is this a proper element to aid in testing
the legitimacy of a child ante-nuptially begotten ?
It was substantially such evidence that was allowed to prevail in
cases where the wife was living separate from her husband and in
adultery. 5 Clarke &F. 163; 4 T. R. 256 356; 20 Alab. 548. And
Lord Mansfield says, Cowp. 594: "suppose from the hour of a
child's birth to the death of its parent it has always been treated
as illegitimate; that would be good evidence." And Fleta, 1. 15.
4, and Bracton, 2. 29. 5, attribute the same value to the act of disowning and sending away a child from the house. Arid surely it
must be so, when reputation is sufficient evidence of parentage, even
when the parents are living. 4 Bing. 266.
Such repudiation of a child seems to me very strong evidence of
bastardy, regarding it according to the ordinary manifestations of
human feeling; for no man, who believes himself to be the father,
could thus ruthlessly and perseveringly sever the ties of blood, and
no mother could submit to such a severance, and to the abiding indignity involved in it, unless it was just. If the charge were untrue,
she would leave her .unworthy husband and cleave unto her child.
I think the evidence ought to have been admitted.
But we have still another question to dispose of. Is the mother
a competent witness to prove that a child, begotten before marriage
and born after it, is not her husband's ?
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I know that it has been said that public policy excludes the
mother in bastardy and pauper cases, from being a witness to bastardize tier children, by proving the non-access of her husband.
11 East, 132; 6 Bin. 291; 5 Ad. & E. 180. But what
idea is this term, public policy, intended to express? I understand it as a general term, expressive of the principles upon which
certain persons are excluded as witnesses. If this is not so, then
it is to me an undefined and transcendental term, and I cannot
consent to use it as a screen for my ignorance. That is a bungling
analysis that ends in undefined results, and I cannot admit that
this term, public policy, is a mere receptacle of the sediment of the
analytic process. I receive it as a term expressive of all the reasons which the law admits as available against the competency of
evidence or witnesses, if we allow it to go beyond those reasons that
reject evidence that is violative of confidential relations. It never
excludes relevant truth on account of its indecency; else it might
at once declare that no causes should be tried that involve questions
of immorality.
I admit that in bastardy and pauper cases, when the mother is a
married woman, she is not competent, without a prima facie case
having been first made out, that she has had no intercourse with her
husband that would account for the birth. I say a primafaciecase,
because that is all that is made out by proof that the husband and
wife were living apart in the same country, and within visiting distance, which was the proved non-access of many of the cases. 6
Binney, 283; Stra. 51; 1 Queen's B. R. 444; 1 Brown's R.
(Appendix) 47. How doeb this make her competent ? Because it
will justify the jury in finding that the husband is not the father,
and therefore is not interested. Some cases say that she must not
be the ozly witness of non-access (1 Wils. 340; 8 East, 202, 211;
Itardw. Cas. 77 ; 6 Binney, 288, 291); and this involves the same
ilea. If her husband's interest is apparently removed, she may
te tify'tc the paternity,-which she could not do without adding expressly or impliedly that she had had no intercourse with her husband
ab~out the time of the conception.
I l:now that Lord Mansfield is reported, Oowp. 594, as having
sai'.d that "it is a rule, founded in decency, morality and policy, that
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they (husband and wife) shall not be permitted to say after marriage
that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring
is spurious." But he was speaking of post-nuptial intercourse, and
the word thtat is misplaced. He might truly say so in that sense,
and not in relition to ante-nuptial intercourse: for surely it is eminently moral and decent to deny criminal connection, and for either
to acquit the other of it; and if they were charged with it, the law
would, in an action of slander, presume it untrue. And when the
wife is rendered competent by the apparent non-access of her husband, no ideas of decency are allowed to exclude her from testifying to her own adulterous connection with a stranger.
To suppose that it is a regard for decency that excludes so close
an investigation of the truth, is to overlook the whole spirit of our
legislation and jurisprudence on this subject. To allow the few
dollars that are involved in a bastardy case to be a sufficient reason
for demanding the truth, even from the mother; and yet to shut
it out in inheritance cases, which usually involve much greater
amounts, and which, by the very reason of moral refinement, have
a most intense moral interest, would be taking a very low and
materialistic view of the demands of justice in such cases. To refuse, on grounds of decency, to allow the wife to testify of her husband's absence, and yet to compel her to testify that she has had
criminal intercourse with another man, is surely very absurd. To
say that necessity demands the testimony of the wife when the State
wants to know who shall support a bastard; and that it is otherwise
when the State wants to know how to divide an inheritance, is surely
to talk Without thinking. And.to suppose that the mother is not
admitted until the child's bastardy has been otherwise proved, is to
overlook some things already said, and also the fact that cohabitation and reputation are prima facie evidence of marriage and of
consequent legitimacy; and yet, in inheritance and pauper cases,
the parents are competent to disprove the apparent marriage, and
thus to show illegitimacy. Cowp. 591; 2 Phil. Ev. 287; 8 Pick. 293.
Lord Kenyon says, 6 T. R. 831, "if the parents may be called to
prove that the children are legitimate, there is no reason why they
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should be considered incompetent to prove that they are illegitimate." Other cases show, that the mother may be a witness as to
the legitimacy of her children. 2 Stra. 925. Hardw. Cases, 74.
And when to all this we add, what we find in all the books of evidence, that reputation of marriage and parentage; of legitimacy
and illegitimacy; the declarations of parents about their children;
their treatment of them, and their family records, are evidence of
inheritance; how can we, with any systematic consistency, say that
the parents are incompetent witnesses of these facts ?
Legal evidence is the means of arriving at truth in juridical controversies, and it depends so completely upon natural principles, and
it is naturally so much modified by the constant changes and developments of the social life, that no people, I believe, has ever
attempted to reduce its rules into a system of positive law. It is
only when courts have set up bad ones as positive law, that the
legislative power has been compelled to interfere and institute others
more natural. In this case, it seems to me, we are converting an
unnatural rule of evidence into a rule of positive law; for we are
rejecting a witness that naturally knows best the fact under investigation, and evidence that would tend to demonstrate it. This is
imposing a dead and arbitrary law, where we ought to have a living
and natural one. It seems like an effort to give new life to the
fossil ideas of a wornout age. It is refusing to the law its proper
character of being the expression of a living sympathy between
the government and the people. Rightly expressing this sympathy,
the law is right; otherwise it is not; "one touch of nature makes
the whole world kin."
I have a very strong belief that the evidence offered in this case
is of the very kind that is naturally the most convincing, and I
think that its value would be properly tested by submitting it to a
jury. I do not believe that any jury would hesitate upon it to pronounce this claimant a bastard; and the more pure and intelligent
the jury, the more certain 'would be this result.
I have now performed my duty in relation to this case; I have
done it sincerely, earnestly and carefully; but my brethren have
come io a different result. And I am sure that they have con-
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sidered it as earnestly, and carefully and sincerely as I have done.
I most sincerely hope that they are right; for, if they are, they
have declared the very justice of this case, and have saved us from
conclusions that might operate very unjustly in time to come. I
cannot see as they do, and yet I freely admit, that with their
opinions against me, the probabilities must be that I am wrong. I
would reverse the judgment on both points.
Judgment affirmed.

In the Court of Common Pleas of the Twefth Judicial District
of Pennsylvania.
IN THE MATTER OF DAVID MUMMA'S ACCOUNT.
An attorny at law, guardian of minors, can lawfully charge his wards for professional services, in conducting litigation for their benefit.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
This case came before the court, on the report of an auditor
appointed to pass on the account of David Mumma, Esq., guardian
of the minor children of William Gotshall, deceased.
The report showed that the accountant had commenced and conducted to successful termination, an action for the recovery of damages for injury done by the Harrisburg and Lancaster Railroad to
the estate of the wards. - The amount paid by the guardian to assistant counsel was allowed by the auditor, but the sum of one hundred dollars claimed for his own professional services was disal]owed.
Exception was taken to the report, and after argument, the following opinion was delivered by
PEARSON, P. J.-The report of an auditor presents a single
question, "can a guardian, who is an attorney-at-law, charge his

ward for professional services rendered ?" The auditor came to the
conclusion that he could not, and struck the item from the account.

DAVID MUMMA'S ACCOUNT.

The beneficial character of the service is conceded, but it is said
to be against legal policy to sustain the charge, and that it is con*%Vy to settled principles of jurisprudence. In Pennpylvania we
have ano deedslon upon the stubject of which I am aware, and the sitdftor, thereIore, adopting the -English rule, has shown by a cleat,
ucie and logical argument, that from the law as there establishej,
the claim must be disallowed.
. In England it is clearly settled that a trustee is never entitled to
compensation, however arduous the duties of the trust, except where
there is an express provision found in the instrument creating it, and
this rule is applicable to every class of trusts, including executors, administrators and guardians.
The doctrine is the same in New York, except where it has been
altered by statute. See 1 Johns. Rep. 27; Idem, 527 ; In re
Bank of Niagara,6 Paige, 213.
In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, the rule is clearly otherwise,
and compensation is allowed in any case, except where the trustee
has undertaken to perform the duties gratuitously.
At the time of the American revolution, there was no decision in
England showing that an attorney-at-law, being a trustee, could not
recover for services rendered to the trust estate as an attorney, and
consequently, as the decisions since are not obligatory, there 'is no
rule binding on us. Had the subject come before their courts at an
antecedent period, I have no doubt that the point would have been
settled as now established. The courts both of law and equity have
long since declared that a trustee could recover no compensation,
nor is anything allowed to a barrister without an express contract,
and probably not to an attorney, beyond his legal fees. But every
State has a right to establish such a system of jurisprudence as best
suits the circumstances of the people, and accords with the interest
of the majority, and in Pennsylvania, from the first settlement of
the province, trustees of every character have been entitled to compensation, and attorneys-at-law can recover on a quantum meruit.
The objection to this claim most relied on under the English law,
has, therefore,, no application in this State.
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It is said to be contrary to public policy to allow any remuneration for professional services to an attorney, when acting in a
fiduciary capacity, as thereby he might be tempted to involve the
estate in improper litigation. His duty might clash *ith his interest, and the latter preponderate. Such appears to be the reasoning of Lord Lyndhurst, as given by Williams, in his treatise on Executors, 1680, and all compensation to the attorney was refused.
See 2 Dow and Clark, 51.
In Christoplhus against 'White, 10 Beavan, 523, the court went
even further, and refused it to the partner of the trustee, as by allowing it the latter would indirectly obtain compensation, which is.
against public policy. It is there said, however, that had another
attorney been employed, it would have been allowable. In the matter
of the Bank of Niagara, 6 Paige, 213, the same course of reasoning
is adopted by the chancellor of New York, and nothing was allowed
to the attorney-trustee but his legally taxable costs. "As a trustee
he must perform his duty without compensation, and as an attorney
can recover nothing for services without a contract, and cannot bargain with himself." It is also stated that there would be great
danger in suffering a trustee to employ counsel when he is himself
to be employed. On the contrary we have a decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, in Harrisvs. Martin, 9 Ala. R. 895, in
which the whole subject is fully and ably examined, and compensation allowed an attorney-administrator, for attending to suits brought
and carried on bonafide.
The court declare, that for advice, or other small acts done in the
performance of the trust, he cannot be compensated, but for litigation of importance to the estate, publicly conducted, there can be
no difficulty in the court determining the propriety of the proceeding and amount of remuneration, and an allowance should be made
equal to that ordinarily given to counsel of equal standing for similar services, the court to judge of the necessity.
The difference is clearly pointed out between the rule in England
and Alabama, both as to compensation to trustees and attorneys,
and it is said that there is no reason why an attorney should not be
allowed for his services when necessary, and bonafide rendered, and
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the inquiry should be, " what would a prudent man, vested with the
functions of an administrator, feel authorized to pay an attorney
under all the circumstances ?"
This decision, in all its bearings, is better adapted to our system
ofjurisprudence than the rule adopted in England and New York,
and I am disposed to follow it.
For one humble member of the legal profession I never can consent to establish a rule by which it is implied that every lawyer is
dishonest, and will encourage litigation for the mere purpose of putting money in his own pocket. By a parity of reasoning we must
say, that if the guardian chanced to be a physician, he could not
charge for professional services rendered to his ward in case of sickness, because he had an interest in creating an imaginary disease so
as to render the services; or if the sickness were real, in making
more visits than the nature of the case required. Should he be a
tailor, shoemaker, or hatter, the bills for articles furnished the minor in his line should be rejected, because the interest of the mechanic would lead him to furnish too great an amount of the particular kind of clothing to the ward, thereby clashing with his duty.
The court can as well determine as to the necessity and propriety
of litigation, as it can of the mechanics' bills, and infinitely better
than of the service of the physician.
We feel ourselves fully authorized, on every sound legal principle
in force in Pennsylvania, to allow a fair and reasonable compensation for professional services rendered by a trustee, the court always
being the judge as to the propriety, necessity, and value of the services. Nor do we believe that such a rule will endanger the interest
of the cestui que trust, but on the contrary, will tend to promote it.
By the practice of the English and New York courts, the trustee
is tempted to give himself as little trouble as possible in relation to
the trust estate. He may know of valid claims, yet fail to pursue
them, as thereby his labor is increased without adding to his compensation. A -vigilant, active, intelligent lawyer, acting in a fiduciary capacity, may be able to ferret out and recover property of
value to thvoe whonm h- represents, and in our opinion the interests
cf society are promoted by encouraging him in so doing. We can-
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not believe that by so deciding'we clash with any rule of law or
public policy.
In England and New York, an attorney administrator is justifiable in engaging another attorney to attend to the interest of the
estate, and if such an attorney happen to be an executor or guardian, he may in turn employ his employer in relation to is trust.
Why not permit each to attend to the business of the estate, which he
best understands, and not drive the two to an exchange of labor ?
The litigation, for attending to which the present compensation
is claimed, came under the immediate observation of this court.
We can, therefore, judge of its propriety, and the extent of the services. The guardian through his knowledge as an attorney, and by
his vigilance in the pursuit of his profession, saved the wh6le amount
recovered from the railroad company, for his wards, and is, in our
opinion well entitled to the compensation demanded.
If we had not the power to allow it in this form, we should in
another, by increasing the sum given by the auditor to cover expenses, and as compensation for his labor as guardian. We prefer,
however, to meet and decide the main question of the case, it being
of great importance to the legal profession in this commonwealth,
as they, more than any other class of men, are called upon to act
in a fiduciary capacity.
It is ordered that the report of the auditor be reversed on the
exception filed. That the account as originally filed be confirmed,
and the costs of the audit paid out of the fund in the hands of the
guardian to be equally deducted from the share of each ward.

In the Supreme Cour of Tennessee, September Term, 1856.
MARCUS 0. PARKER VS. REBECCA MEEK, SR.1
1. The parent, as such, has no direct remedy at common law for the seduction of a
daughter. He has to vesort therefor to what has been denominated, "but little
I We are indebted to the learned State Reporter, John L. T. Sneed, Esq., for the
early sheets of this 3d Vol.

PARKER vs. MEEK.
more than matter of fiction "-the relation of master and servant assumed to
exist between parent and child-in order to redress this wrong. Two distinct
actions, it is true, are submitted to his option, but both have relation to this hypotbesis of loss of service, upon which they are dependent-in the one case, as
matter in the aggravation of damages; and, in the other, as the very gist of the
action itself.
2. In the action of trespass vi et armis for debauching a daughter, the gravamen is
the illegal entry of the seducer upon the parent's premises; and the seduction
itself, and consequent loss of service, may be averred and proven in aggravation
of damages. In an action on the case for the same injury, the gravamen is the
consequential injuries arising from the seduction, in loss of service to the parent.
In the first action, it is essential that the daughter, whether of fall age or not,
should have been upon the parent's premises at the time of the seduction ; in the
latter, whatever be the age of the daughter, it is immaterial when the wrong was
perpetrated, so that she reside with the parent some portion of the time of her
pregnancy, or of her lying-in.
3. In actions for seduction, proof of menial services by the daughter to the parent
is not necessary. Evidence of the most trifling and valueless acts of service is
sufficient. Indeed, it seems, that the fact that the daughter lived with the parent
for a time during the period of pregnancy and parturition, is of itself sufficient
to raise a presumption of service. This, however, may be rebutted by proof that
she lived with the parent as boarder, or in some other relation than that of mere
child or servant.
4. If the daughter lived with the mother before and at the time the child was born,
performing service for her,'the mother had a legal right to maintain an action of
ease for the seduction, although the father, who had died before the birth of the
child, was living at the time of the seduction.

This was an action on the case, instituted in the Circuit Court of
Knox county, in May, 1852, by Rebecca Meek, Sr., against Marcus
C. Parker, for debauching Rebecca Meek, Jr., the daughter of the
plaintiff. The seduction occurred on the 10th of August, 1851, at
the house of her father, and the said Rebecca, Jr., was delivered of
a child in April, 1852. The father of Rebecca, Jr., (lied on the
14th of October, 1851, and she being then in the twenty-fourth
year of her age, continued to reside with her mother, the plaintiff,
until the delivery of the child. At the June term, 1853, before
Alexander, Judge, there was a verdict for the plaintiff, assessing her
damages at $2,500 and judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed in error to this court. This cause was Leard at
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the September term, 1853, and was continued upon advisement until
the present term, when the opinion was delivered.
TF.R. Sneed, Lyon and Temple, for the plaintiff i,error.
.?odgers and Boyd, for the defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McKINNEY, J.-This was an action on the case, brought in the
Circuit Court of Knox, for the seduction of Rebecca Meek, Jr., the
daughter of the plaintiff. The daughter was examined as a witness.
She testified that when seduced-which was on the 10th of August,
1851-she was twenty-four years of age; that, at the time of her
seduction she was a member of her father's family and living in his
house; that her father died on the 14th of October, 1851, little
more than two months after she was seduced; that during the life
of her father, she performed services for him, and after his death,
she continued to live with her mother, and to perform services for
her, up to the time of the birth of her child, which took place on
the 24th of April, 1852, and has since resided with her.
Upon the foregoing facts it was insisted, on the trial, by the defendant's counsel, that the mother could not maintain this action,
the seduction being in the lifetime of the father, with whom the
daughter lived at the time she was seduced. But the court instructed
the jury, "That if the daughter was living with her mother, before
and at the time the child was born, performing service for her, 'that
the mother had a legal right to maintain the suit, notwithstanding
the father may have been alive when the act of seduction took
place." The jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages
at $2,500. The court refused a new trial, and the defendant
appealed in error.
The question is-did the court err in this instruction ?
The remedy afforded by the common law to a parent for the seduction of a daughter, when followed by pregnancy, is founded, not
upon the relation of parent and child, but upon that of master and
servant. The action, in most cases, may be either trespa8s or case;
and the distinction between the two actions, as respects the ground
of recovery, is important to be kept in view. Where there has
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bem an illegal entry into the father's house or premises, by the seducer, an action of trespass, vi et armis, may be maintained, for
the breaking of the house, or trespass on the premises, and the seduction of the daughter, and consequential loss of service, may be
alleged and proved as an aggravation of the damages: Or an action
on the case may be supported, founded merely on the consequences
of the seduction.
In the former action, in which the illegal entry of the father's
house is the technical ground of the action, and the seduction and
loss of service is considered as only matter in aggravation of the
trespass, it may well enough be maintained, consistently with the
nature of the action and the principles by which it is governed,
that it cannot be supported unless the daughter were living with the
plaintiff at the time of the injury. But, in an action on the case,
the ground of which is, the consequential injury resulting from the
seduction, it is unimportant whether or not the person seduced lived
with the plaintiff at the time the seduction took place. It is admitted that this conclusion is directly opposed by the case of .Dean
vs. Peel, 5 East, 45, and other cases, both English and American,
.oited in the brief for the plaintiff in error ; but we think it is fully
supported by reason and weight of authority.
When it is said that this remedy is founded on the relation of
master and servant, and that therefore, the gist of the action is the
loss of service; it must be borne in mind that such relation, as has
been well observed, is "little more than matter of fiction, made use
of to support the action." 3 Stark. on Ev. 1307. By the common law, a parent cannot, in that character merely, support an action for debauching his daughter. The action is maintainable only
in respect of the supposed loss of service. BI. Com. vol. 3, 142,
n. 14. 2 Saund. on Pl. & Ev. 350. This idea of the loss of service to
the master, is said to be a necessary fiction of law, in order that the
person seduced may be a competent witness ; as otherwise the
wrong-doer might escape for want of proof; the injury, from its
nature, being susceptible of proof only through the parties to it.
See Reeve's Domestic Relations, 293, n. 1. And it is to be observed, that the authorities which adhere most rigidly to the doc-
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trine, that the loss of service is the foundation of this remedy, admit at the same time, that the most trifling and valueless acts of
service are sufficient; and that the mere loss of menial service is
not the real ground of the action. But, notwithstanding the doctrine maintained by the older authorities upon this subject, it is now
well settled by numerous cases, both English and American, and
upon more just and enlightened views of the domestic relations, that
proof of actual service by the daughter is not necessary to support
this action. See Hewett vs. Prime, 21 Wend. 79, and cases there
cited. If the daughter lives in her father's family, service will be
presumed. It is immaterial whether she be a minor or of full age,
if she live with her father. If under age, she is, of course, his
servant. But, though this is not the case, if she be of full age,
yet from the fact that she lives with her father, the presumption is
that she is his servant, unless such presumption be removed by proof
that she lives with him otherwise than as a servant. Reeve's Domestic Relations, 292.
The case of -Deanvs. Peel is denied to be law by several American cases. And it is well settled, that if the daughter be a minor,
it is not material that she should be living in her father's family at
the time of her seduction, to entitle him to maintain an action on
the case against her seducer. In Martin vs. Payine, 9 Johns. Rep.
387, a daughter of the age of 19, went to live with an uncle, with
her father's consent. The uncle agreed to pay her for her work,
but there was no agreement for any definite time. While there
she was seduced, and immediately afterwards returned to the house
of her father, who maintained her, and paid the expenses of her
lying-in; though, until her seduction, she had no intention of returning to her father. And it was held that the father might maintain an action on the case against her seducer; the father not having divested himself of the legal right to reclaim the services of his
daughter; the relation of master and servant was presumed from
his right to command her services. In the case of Sargent vs.
,5 Cowen's Rep. 106, a widow bound her minor daughter,
by indenture, as a servant till the age of 18. During the period
of her service she was seduced. When her pregnancy was disco32
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vered, the indentures were canceled by consent, and the daughter
returned to live with her mother, and while in her service, was delivered of a child. It was held that an action on the case might
be maintained by the mother against the seducer. The court say,
that from the time of the return of the daughter to her mother's
house, at least, the relation of mistress and servant was restored
between them; and that when the action is case, it is not material
who was entitled to the services of the daughter at the time of the
seduction; the real inquiry. is, on whom has the consequential injury fallen ? It cannot be necessary, says the court, according to
the theory or just principles by which this action is regulated, that
the parent, in order to sustain it, should be entitled to the services
of the daughter at the very instant when the act is committed
which subsequently results in a loss of service, or necessary pecuniary disbursement.
In Clarke vs. Fitch, 2 Wend. Rep. 457, the daughter being a
minor, left her father's house, by his permission, to work for and
maintain herself. She was seduced and gave birth to a child. From
before her seduction until after the birth of her child, she had never
been in her father's house. But the person by whom the expenses
of her lying-in had been paid, looked to her father for reimbursement. And on the ground of this liability, it was held that the
father might maintain an action on the case for seduction. Because
the father had a right to recall his daughter and control her services; and the loss fell upon him of the expenses of her confinement and sickness. So in Hornketh vs. Barr, 8 Serg. & R. 36,
the same doctrine was held ; and it is maintained by several other
cases referred to in the argument. In these cases, the minor daughter is regarded as de jure the servant of the father, though defacto
the servant of another at the time ; on the principle, tha the
daughter, though not living with her father at the time of the injury, was still subject to his control, and he had the legal right to
command .her services ; and hence the supposed relation of master
and servant was presumed to exist.
The fictitious relationship of master and servant does not, however, exist where the person seduced was of full age at the time of
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the injury. In the latter case the daughter is not, in law, the servant of her parent; nor is he liable for her maintainance, or the
expenses of her confinement. Hence, to entitle the parent to maintain an action for debauching a daughter above the age of twentyone, it must, at least, appear, that during some portion of the time
of her pregnancy, or of her lying-in, she was a member of his family. From the fact of her living with her parent, service will be
presumed, as has been already shown. But, where the action is
case, it is no more necessary in the case of a daughter of full age,
than in that of a minor, that she should have been living in the
family of the parent at the time of the seduction; nor is it any
more important in the one than in the other, who was entitled to,
or enjoying her services at the time of the injury. The only inquiry of importance in either case, is, on whom has the consequential injury fallen? And such person, whether father, mother, or
other person standing in loco parentis, is entitled to legal redress
in the present form of action.
When the action is tresspass vi et armis, it is admitted the law
is otherwise. In the latter action, the breaking the house, or illegal
entry upon the premises, being the legal ground of the action; and
the consequential injuries but matter of aggravation; and a justification of the entry into the house, or upon the premises, in such
case, being a. sufficient justification: of the whole charge in the declaration; it is clear, that if the person seduced were not living in
the house of her parent, or in his actual service at the time of the
seduction, this action could not be supported. In such case, the
idea of a trespass against the parent is necessarily excluded, and
the ground of action wholly fails. But in an action on the case,
the illegal entry of the parent's house is not an element of the legal ground of action; neither is the-mere act of seduction; the
gist of the action is the consequential damages resulting from the
seduction. It cannot, therefore, upon principle, be at all important
whether the parent was, or was not, entitled to the daughter's services at the time of her seduction. In this view of the law, we
dissent from the conclusion maintained in the cases of Logan vs.
ffurray,6 Serg. & Rawle, 175; Nicholson vs. S t ryker, 10 Johns. 117;

